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Key points 
 The power of the European Parliament (EP) in EU trade policy has increased significantly with the 
Lisbon Treaty. Even though it had already acquired a greater informal role, the codification of its 
involvement enables the EP to have a stronger say in trade policy. Nonetheless, the power of the 
EP is still more limited than that of the Council. 
 The rejection of the ACTA agreement in 2012 enhanced the EP’s credibility as a veto actor. It 
strengthened the influence of the EP in negotiations on trade mandates. It also enabled the EP to be 
more seriously involved during actual trade negotiations.   
 In EU trade legislation the EP now equals the power of the Council to change European 
Commission proposals, but in the implementation of trade legislation, e.g. anti-dumping decisions, 
its role is still very limited.  
 Substantively, EP trade policy debates have been dominated by left-right divides. The EP generally 
follows the European Commission’s pro-trade agenda although it has sometimes taken a more 
defensive position. 
 Normative principles have been secondary to free trade concerns. The EP has not challenged the 
Commission’s view that human rights-related concerns should be addressed via other channels. 
Only when the EP fears a direct impact on the rights of EU citizens has it shown its teeth. 
 While many opposed the involvement of the EP in EU trade policy on grounds that it would 
hamper its effectiveness, this fear has proven to be unfounded so far. 
 The main challenge for the EP, however, lies in transforming its power into real impact. Whereas 
its legal and political capacities have been strengthened, the new EP legislature will have to make 
sure that this also results in tangible influence.   
 The real test for the EP’s role in EU trade policy will come in the years to follow. With negotiations 
having recently opened with such important players as the US and Japan, the EP has for the first 
time been involved at the earliest stages of the discussions about trade agreements. It will be 
interesting to see if the EP is willing and able to use its informal resolutions on these agreements as 
a de facto mandate, and to call the Commission to order during negotiations if it dislikes the 
direction being taken.  
 Finally, while it is difficult to speculate about the composition of the next European Parliament and 
its influence on EU trade policy, an EP with more radical MEPs and a balance-of-power between 
the S&D and EPP might shift EU trade policy towards a more normatively-oriented stance than 
under the current Parliament where centre and right-wing views on trade have been dominant.  
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The European Parliament’s New Role  
in Trade Policy: Turning power into impact 
Lore Van den Putte, Ferdi De Ville & Jan Orbie* 
CEPS Special Report No. 89 / May 2014 
Lisbon, a giant leap forward 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the power of the 
European Parliament in EU trade policy has considerably increased, especially when 
compared to its almost non-existent formal role in the previous decades. For a long time, 
member states and trade policy experts strongly opposed a stronger role of the EP on 
grounds that trade policy was too technical and that the involvement of the EP would hinder 
efficient negotiations. There was also a fear that the legislature would be too sensitive to 
specific protectionist interests. Over time, however, trade policy affected also non-trade 
issues, which triggered increasing interest on the part of civil society organisations and 
citizens. They criticised the undemocratic nature of EU trade policy-making (on the input 
side) and argued that it was too much focused on liberalisation (on the output side). This 
politicization of trade policy at the beginning of the millennium paved the way for more 
parliamentary involvement. The White Paper on Governance in 2001 and the European 
Convention (2001-03) were the first steps in this direction. Their ideas were codified in the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty.  
According to these new rules, the EP is now required to give its consent to any trade 
agreement negotiated (Art. 218 (6) (a) (i)-(v) TFEU) and during negotiations it should be 
regularly updated on where negotiations are going (Art. 218 (10) TFEU). With regard to EU 
trade legislation, it is now on an equal footing with the Council under the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (OLP) (Art. 207 (2) TFEU).  
Against the background of increased legal competences, this Special Report addresses two 
questions. The first concerns the extent to which the EP’s power in trade has increased: Has 
the EP effectively played a bigger role since the end of 2009? The second relates to the 
substance of the EP’s trade policy preferences: Does the EP attempt to push EU trade 
relations into a more or less normative and/or protectionist direction? Our main argument is 
that the Lisbon Treaty not only heralds a major leap forward in legal terms, but that the 
current EP legislature has also managed to increase its political clout in trade policy-making.1 
Nevertheless, a major challenge for the new EP legislature 2014-2019 will be to turn this into 
effective influence.  
                                                     
* Lore Van den Putte is a PhD candidate at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University, Ferdi 
De Ville is assistant professor at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University and Jan Orbie is 
professor at and director of the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University. 
1 Our claim is supported by interviews with members of staff from the European Commission and the 
European Parliament and by interventions offered at a debate organised by CEPS, 18 March 2014. 
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A growing (in)formal role for the European Parliament 
Traditionally, EU trade policy has been dominated by only two actors: the European 
Commission and the Council. Although the EP has gradually become better informed on 
trade issues since the 1960s, it was not until adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon that its role was 
also formally enhanced. It is unclear, however, precisely what this means in terms of the 
actual power exercised by the EP. Some refer to trade policy as the “most important change” 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Devuyst, 2013) or as a “Copernican revolution”, owing to 
the increased legislative role it ascribes to the EP (Eeckhout, 2011), whereas others suggest 
that the Lisbon Treaty essentially only codifies the EP’s power with regard to multilateral 
trade agreements (Young, 2011). This paper attempts to clarify these questions by 
scrutinising the EP’s performance in trade policy during its first post-Lisbon legislative term 
(2009-14). In so doing, we look separately at the two arenas of EU trade policy: i) negotiations 
on trade agreements between the EU and third countries, and ii) EU trade legislation and the 
implementation of trade policy decisions within the EU.  
International agreements: Impacting on all stages of negotiations 
The negotiation of international agreements basically advances in three phases. Until the 
Lisbon Treaty, each of these phases involved a delicate balancing act between the European 
Commission and the Council, while the Parliament was formally excluded. In the opening 
phase of negotiations, the Commission, in line with the Community Method, had the right of 
initiative. It proposed a negotiation mandate to the Council, which had to be approved in 
order for the Commission to start negotiations. In practice, the EP was involved informally. 
In the second phase involving the actual negotiations, the Commission functioned as the EU 
negotiator on the basis of the Council mandate. These negotiating guidelines are not formally 
binding but are of course key politically. During this stage, the Commission was constantly 
monitored by representatives of the member states in the ‘Article 113/133 Committee’, called 
the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) since Lisbon. Since 1995, the EP and the European 
Commission agreed in inter-institutional agreements that the EP would be informed not only 
about the negotiation mandate but also during the negotiations. The third phase –ratification 
– involved the approval of the Council of the negotiated agreement. How has the Lisbon 
Treaty impacted the EP’s role in the different phases in this process?  
First, the new treaty provisions still do not provide a formal role for the Parliament in the 
initial phase of the mandate. However, in practice, the EP has managed, since the Lisbon 
Treaty, to affect the mandate. Although it is difficult to distinguish the Parliament’s influence 
from that of the Council, there are several indications that the EP exerted a distinctive impact 
– especially when the Council is internally divided. For example, in the case of the mandate 
for trade negotiations with Japan, in a resolution of June 2012, the EP asked the Council not 
to start negotiations before its Committee on International Trade (INTA) had issued its 
position on the proposed mandate. In October of the same year, it requested in a resolution a 
binding review clause within one year after the start of the negotiations, in order to assess 
whether Japan had delivered on its commitment to eliminate non-tariff barriers. This request 
reflected the position of France and some other member states. 
Another example is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Here too, the 
EP supported some members of the Council2 in the mandate phase, successfully arguing for 
the exclusion of audiovisual services. So, all in all, the EP has already started to play an 
important role in the first phase of trade negotiations, even though the Treaty does not 
                                                     
2 While France was the instigator, it was mostly supported by Greece, Hungary and Belgium. 
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stipulate this. The explanation for the EP’s growing informal impact is as follows: as the EP 
now has to give its consent at the end of negotiations, the recommendations it issues in non-
binding resolutions before the negotiations have a similar political weight as the negotiating 
guidelines from the Council. They communicate the ‘red lines’ of the EP in the eventual 
agreement as conditions for its consent. 
Second, in the negotiation phase, the new Treaty for the first time explicitly states that the 
Commission has to ‘report regularly’ to the EP (Art. 218 (10) TFEU) as well as to the Trade 
Policy Committee of the Council ‘on the progress of negotiations’. This constitutes a 
consolidation of an existing practice that goes back for decades (see above). Regarding this 
disclosure of information, there is some disagreement between the MEPs in the INTA 
Committee whether the European Commission fully complies with this. Liberal MEPs, who 
generally have a good relationship with DG Trade (and the liberal Commissioner during this 
legislature), argue that they are treated in the same way as the TPC, while more left-wing 
MEPs and the Greens believe that the disclosed information is rather vague and selective (see 
Richardson, 2012). Sensitive documents (for example, containing detailed Commission 
negotiating positions), are only distributed to a limited number of INTA members. 
It would be wrong to conclude that the EP is now on an equal footing with the Council’s TPC 
during this phase. The Treaty clearly stipulates that this ‘special committee’ can assist the 
Commission during the negotiations which contrasts with the EP which only needs to be 
informed. Besides its greater role awarded by the treaty, the TPC is also more powerful than 
the EP (and its INTA Committee) because of its long-standing relationship with the 
European Commission and because of the expertise it has built up over decades (Kleimann, 
2011). The EP is also politically fragmented and lacks sufficient members of staff, who 
regularly have to shift their attention from one committee to another, and as such it relies 
largely on information from DG Trade and from NGOs and external studies (Richardson, 
2012). Notwithstanding its limited formal power and the above-mentioned constraints to 
influence the negotiations, the EP is still using various means to get its voice heard. Just like 
before the Lisbon Treaty, it makes its voice heard through resolutions, opinions, hearings 
and questions to the Commission.  
Importantly, there are indications that in practice the EP has become more effective in 
influencing trade negotiations. With regard to the TTIP with the US, the EP has managed to 
convince the European Commission to inform the INTA Committee before and after each 
round of negotiation. This is a clear enhancement of the EP’s role, in contrast to earlier 
episodes when the EP was only sporadically updated about the progress of negotiations. 
Now it can give its view on each of the topics of the negotiating rounds.  
Third, trade agreements will henceforth be ratified by the EP and in principle no longer by 
national parliaments. This is because the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU exclusive competences 
in all trade-related issues.3 The Treaty makes it crystal clear that the EP needs to give its 
consent to all trade agreements, thus including FTAs that purely deal with trade flows. 
While this constitutes a significant increase in the Parliament’s power, it should be observed 
that even before the Lisbon Treaty the EP’s assent was already required in a range of cases. 
As such, the Treaty is again to a large extent formalising existing practice (see Woolcock, 
2010). 
In the pre-Lisbon era, however, it was commonly accepted that the EP would never be a 
credible actor in EU trade policy unless it was formally able to reject trade agreements in 
                                                     
3 Given the EU’s exclusive competence in trade issues since Lisbon, only ‘mixed’ agreements still need 
to be ratified by the (sub)national level. Agreements are mixed if they contain also issues for which the 
EU is not exclusively competent (De Ville, 2012). 
4  VAN DEN PUTTE, DE VILLE & ORBIE 
 
which it had a real say throughout the negotiating process, much like the practice in the US 
Congress. EU trade agreements were never threatened with non-ratification after 
negotiations, not only because trade policy was relatively uncontested but also because the 
ratification responsibility was with the national parliaments of the member states. The latter 
felt compelled to agree with a fait accompli which had taken the Commission years to 
negotiate and which they didn’t really monitor, and therefore they never seriously 
challenged trade agreements.  
The new EP quickly made it clear that it would be more critical and proactive. Since Lisbon, 
a new dynamic has emerged whereby threat of a veto by the EP has become more credible, 
and more so than by national parliaments before, because it is not in a straightjacket of the 
parliamentary system of government. The EP is well aware of its new role in EU trade policy 
and is eager to use its newly acquired powers. Already on the occasion of the EU-South 
Korea agreement, which was mainly negotiated during the previous legislature, the EP 
warned that its views should be taken seriously. An EPP member of INTA stated: "The 
notion that it will be a smooth process is naïve; Parliament will not just rubber-stamp the 
deal."(Fjellner, 2010). This statement, amongst other, instilled fear in the Council that trade 
policy would be hindered because the EP would have to get used to its new role. This fear 
proved to be unfounded for the agreement with South Korea. However, the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)4 shows that this new context has enhanced the 
EP’s confidence to reject a trade agreement that goes against its preferences, where 
negotiations were not sufficiently transparent and where it is influenced by a large public 
campaign. The rejection served as a reality check for the other EU institutions. It has 
enhanced the EP’s power in international trade negotiations, even in the first and second 
phases, as described above.  
EU trade legislation and day-to-day implementation 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the consultation procedure applied to EU trade legislation, 
meaning that the Council adopted Commission proposals with at best a consultation with 
the EP. The 2001 ‘Everything but Arms’ Regulation providing duty-free and quota-free 
market access for the least-developed countries illustrates the Parliament’s limited 
involvement in trade policy-making at that time. Despite the symbolic importance of this 
initiative as well as its broader ramifications for EU trade and development policies, the EP 
was never formally involved and only issued its resolution several months after the Council 
had adopted the regulation. 
The Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) has applied since Lisbon, meaning that the EP is 
now on par with the Council for the essential elements of the EU’s Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP). And it managed to get many of its amendments accepted. For example on the 
South Korea safeguard regulation, the EP managed to secure more effective protection of 
European electronic and car industries than was foreseen in the draft from the European 
Commission. Also for the first time in more than 40 years, the modernisation of the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) involved negotiations with the EP. The regulation 
                                                     
4 ACTA was an agreement negotiated between the EU and its member states, the US, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland with the 
aim to enforce intellectual property rights. Negotiations started in 2006 but only in 2012 the EP had to 
give its consent. The EP plenary rejected the agreement on 4 July 2012 with a majority of 478 votes 
against (70%), 39 in favour (6%) and 165 abstentions (24%). This was not only due to the secrecy of the 
negotiations, but also due to a large public campaign and demonstrations all over Europe against the 
agreement. 
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was approved after first reading and incorporates the EP’s amendments.5 It is also expected 
to play an important role in the modernisation of the Union’s trade defence instruments.  
While the introduction of OLP enhances the democratic accountability of EU trade legislation 
(see Devuyst, 2013), the question remained what to do in specific cases where a quick 
reaction is needed (i.e. implementation), for example when addressing perceived dumping on 
the European market. Such issues cannot be decided by the OLP because this procedure is 
too lengthy, but are dealt with through the exercise of implementing powers conferred on 
the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon also changed the regime for delegated6 and 
implementing acts, in which the EP instead sided with the Commission against the member 
states in defending the new institutional balance as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty while 
ensuring more influence for itself in implementing powers in the CCP.  
However, for the most important implementing power – anti-dumping decisions – the 
examination procedure under implementing acts applies. This means that for the 
implementation of this most-used trade defence instrument, the Commission is assisted by a 
committee of representatives of the member states (called the anti-dumping committee), 
while the EP only has the right of scrutiny. So in the implementation of important trade 
policy decisions, such as anti-dumping measures, the EP is involved in a limited fashion and 
can only oversee the Commission’s implementation, together with the Council whose ability 
to reject trade defence measures is still more elaborate. In some other cases where executive 
powers of the Commission have been defined as ‘delegated acts’, the EP has gained more 
power.  
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the EP’s influence in international trade 
has increased. Even if it remains less involved than the Council and its TPC (e.g. in phases 1 
and 2 of negotiations), and even if some provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are a consolidation 
of existing practices (e.g. in phases 2 and 3), the growing role of the EP in EU trade policy 
cannot be denied. The most visible example of this has been the rejection of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which has subsequently further strengthened the EP’s 
position in all phases of trade negotiations. Of course, the EP’s impact cannot be seen in 
isolation from other actors. The EP has often supported the Council, or at least some 
members of the Council, thereby going against the Commission’s preferences. First, in the 
case of audiovisual services in the TTIP negotiating mandate, it supported France and other 
member states in a resolution to exclude these issues from the talks. Second, in the case of the 
safeguard clause for the South Korea agreement, the EP urged stronger protection for the 
automobile sector, as was demanded by Italy and to a lesser extent by Germany. In each 
case, the EP took sides with a minority within the Council that is also more protectionist than 
the Commission. This brings us to the next question: What is the EP’s substantive position in 
EU trade policy – and does it indeed have a more protectionist impact? 
                                                     
5 The EP introduced amendments calling for greater transparency and more scrutiny rights for 
Parliament, tougher tariffs against environmental and social dumping and against dumping assisted 
by third-country export subsidies. The EP also voted to reject a proposal from the Commission to give 
importers and exporters two weeks prior notification of plans to impose provisional anti-dumping 
duties. At the time of writing, the EP and the Council would enter into legislative negotiations in 
order to reach a first-reading agreement.   
6 An important example of a delegated act is all changes concerning the list of GSP beneficiaries. 
Under delegated acts, the EP has the right to object to an act proposed by the Commission. The S&D, 
Greens and GUE Group in January 2014 objected to a Commission delegated regulation on the list of 
GSP+ beneficiaries because it argued that the EP should not be forced to vote on the complete list of 
GSP+ beneficiaries but should be able to vote on a separate delegated act for each country, but the 
resolution was rejected.    
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The EP’s substantive position  
For what purposes is the EP using its newly acquired powers? EP votes on international 
trade have typically followed a left-right division. In most of the cases, GUE7 and the Greens 
(the left side of the ideological spectrum) vote against trade agreements proposed by the 
Commission or legislative work done by the EP on Commission proposals. ALDE, the EPP 
and the ECR are mostly in favour. Leaving aside ACTA, all these groups display a high 
voting cohesion. An important exception is the S&D group, whose members are mostly 
aligned with the centre-right groups on trade issues but where in most cases a significant 
proportion of non-loyal members can be found. However, our findings generally confirm the 
Hix & Noury (2009) argument that voting in the EP has evolved from national lines to 
political group lines. What these results cannot answer is whether the EP’s involvement 
makes EU trade policy more protectionist and/or whether it makes trade policy more 
normative than before Lisbon.  
Protectionist worries within a liberal policy 
A first substantive question is whether the EP generally follows the pro-liberalisation agenda 
of DG Trade in the European Commission. Certainly, the EP is not opposing the conclusion 
of trade agreements. Since Lisbon, the EP has rather smoothly approved trade agreements, 
except for ACTA, which was not really focused on trade liberalisation per se. On the 
contrary, as witnessed in the case of the EU-Japan FTA, the EP has insisted on sufficient 
market opening for EU businesses in third countries. However, on specific issues, the EP has 
sometimes sided with the most conservative8 members of the Council. Looking again at the 
South Korea agreement, the importance of strong safeguards for the protection of the 
European automotive industry was already stressed in its resolution of 2007. It managed to 
delay the provisional application of the agreement. In the meantime, it secured a stronger 
safeguard clause for car producers than was proposed by the Commission. Furthermore, 
together with the industry, the EP has the right to call for an investigation by the European 
Commission. So the defensive automotive industry was more successful in influencing the 
EP than the Council. The same pattern holds for the mandate for negotiations with the US in 
the TTIP. While the EP in general expressed itself very much in favour of the negotiations, it 
supported France (and a few other member states) in keeping audiovisual services outside 
the scope of negotiations. 
Another example is the Commission’s proposal for a new GSP regulation, which already was 
a compromise hammered out between free traders, protectionists and developmentalists. 
The exclusion of economically stronger developing countries could be welcomed by free 
traders as an incentive to conclude FTAs, while protectionists were happy with the less 
preferential treatment of competitive economies, and developmentalists could understand 
that the GSP should focus on the poorest countries. The EP largely agreed with this delicate 
balance between different trade preferences. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht also 
suggested this in his report to the EP: “Our internal discussions in the Commission were as 
complex as yours, and our proposal was the result of very careful reflection and a detailed 
                                                     
7 GUE/NGL is the Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left. With the 
Greens we mean the Group of the European Greens/European Free Alliance in the EP. ALDE is the 
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The EPP is the European Peoples’ Party, 
currently the largest group in the EP. ECR stands for the group of the European Conservatives and 
Reformists in the EP. S&D or the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats is the 
second largest political group in the EP. 
8 In this analysis ‘conservative’ is not understood as an ideological, right-wing tendency, but rather as 
the defence of the status quo and an opposition to change. 
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impact assessment.”9 On the one hand, the EP made the GSP regulation more protectionist 
by lowering the threshold for safeguard measures, and on the other hand it slightly 
broadened the scope of liberalised products. 
We can conclude in general that the EP supports the EU’s liberalisation agenda, but within 
this liberal framework it gives some more support to special protectionist interests than the 
other institutions.  
Normative concerns of secondary order  
A second substantive question relates to the normative position of the EP. Does it serve as a 
new gateway for societal interests such as trade unions and NGOs? It was commonly 
expected that the EP’s upgraded role would make the CCP more normative, meaning that it 
would take social, environmental, human rights and democracy-related concerns more into 
account. This expectation is rather logical since the EP is the only institution that has a direct 
connection with its constituents, including civil society and NGOs. Apart from that, the new 
stipulation that the CCP should be conducted in accordance with the principles and 
objectives of the EU’s external action (Art. 207 TFEU) makes it easier for the EP to argue for 
linkages between trade and broader external policy objectives such as sustainable 
development and human rights.  
South Korea was the first trade agreement that the EP had to approve under the new Treaty. 
Already in the beginning of the negotiations in 2007 the EP had stipulated its conditions for 
consent in a resolution. The EP basically aimed to copy the demands laid down by the US 
Congress on environmental and social clauses. However, the EP’s success in this regard is 
mixed. To be sure, the agreement does include a sustainable development chapter with social 
and environmental provisions, but these are not enforceable. Moreover, also the Commission 
and the Council have also been in favour of sustainability provisions in trade agreements, so 
the EP cannot claim that this is its own victory. 
Another interesting case is the trade agreement with Colombia and Peru, because here the 
EP explicitly pursued foreign policy aims. The agreement was controversial for many 
reasons, but mostly because of the grave violations of trade union rights in Colombia, the 
country with the highest murder rate of trade unionists worldwide. While the biggest 
proponents of the agreement – the EPP and Spain – wanted to reward Colombia for its 
progress on human rights issues, the opponents mostly from the Greens and GUE argued 
that an FTA would mean condoning these practices. A lot of protest, both from within the EP 
and from outside organisations, obliged the EP to ask for a binding action plan on human 
rights. As such, it could compromise the aim of free trade on the one hand and the EU’s 
normative obligation to ensure respect for human rights globally on the other hand. While 
this might seem a strong normative commitment, the Action Plan was fiercely criticized 
because of the lack of clearly identifiable benchmarks with regard to human rights, labour 
rights and the environment. As such, normatively, the EP did not try to change the 
agreement in any meaningful way.   
The GSP case discussed above also illustrates that the EP’s preferences do not differ 
considerably from the Commission’s position. The EP basically accepted the GSP-plus 
incentive system as proposed by the Commission, which provides more market access for 
developing countries that comply with a number of international conventions on sustainable 
development and human rights. The EP only made the criteria slightly stricter by adding 
                                                     
9 European Parliament (2012). Debate on the Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences. Consulted on 
24 July 2013 on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20120611 
&secondRef=ITEM-019&language=EN. 
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that “the country in question must not have formulated a reservation in relation to any of the 
conventions … which is prohibited by the convention or which is considered to be 
incompatible with its object and purpose”. The EP also made it more explicit that the 
Commission should monitor the implementation of the relevant conventions, and added that 
findings of third parties such as the EP and civil society groups should be taken into account. 
A more fundamental change was proposed by the Committee on Development and by the 
Greens who insisted that the EU should look at the Human Development Index instead of 
the GDP in order to determine which countries are eligible for trade preferences. But they 
were outvoted on this point by the INTA Committee and the majority of the plenary.  
Another example is when the EP, after having rejected the one-year extension of the fisheries 
protocol with Morocco in December 2012,10 managed to make some normative 
improvements in the agreement. However, in the final analysis, the most fundamental 
normative concerns did not constitute make-or-break points. The reasons for its rejection 
were mainly the sustainability of the fish population, the incompatibility of the agreement 
with international law because it was not proven that local people would benefit from it and 
the fact that the EU would have to pay too much in exchange for only a few benefits. After a 
revision of the protocol with a better cost-benefit ratio and more protection for the 
sustainability of fish stocks, the EP gave its consent for a new four-year agreement with 
Morocco. Several members of different political groups were disappointed, however, that the 
new agreement still did not contain a strong human rights clause and that the Western 
Sahara was not excluded from the agreement.  
To summarise, none of the above-mentioned cases involving normative issues constituted a 
red line for the EP. Nor did it take a normative position that was fundamentally different 
from the Commission or the Council. Similarly, human rights concerns were never a 
breaking point. The only cases where normative considerations proved to be a fundamental 
point for the EP concerned situations where the rights of EU citizens might be infringed. The 
rejection of ACTA proved this point very clearly. The EP mentioned several reasons for its 
rejection of ACTA, such as the secrecy of the negotiations, the fear for reduced access to 
generic medicines in developing countries and the legal uncertainties of the treaty. However, 
the most important objection was the possible infringement of individual freedoms, the 
freedom of expression and privacy on the internet.  
Concluding remarks 
This CEPS Special Report has shown that the EP has gained power in trade policy since the 
Lisbon Treaty, but in a more subtle and ‘political’ way than a purely legal reading would 
suggest. With regard to international agreements, the Lisbon Treaty has mostly formalised 
existing practice. However, with the rejection of ACTA the EP has managed to use its 
formally increased power in the third phase of negotiations to increase its standing in the 
other phases of the negotiations. This precedent has been an eye-opener for both the 
European Commission and the Council. Nonetheless, the power of the EP is still more 
limited than that of the Council. With regard to EU trade legislation the EP is now on par 
with the Council, which is a significant enhancement of power compared to its previous 
situation. Also in this legislative dimension of trade policy, it has already shown that it is 
willing to use its new powers. While the EP remains rather sidelined in implementing trade 
policy acts, it has left its mark on the new regime for delegating and implementing acts, 
thereby enhancing its own role and ensuring the supranational character of the regime. 
                                                     
10 In December 2011 the EP already dissolved the protocol to the EU-Morocco agreement which had 
been applied temporarily since 28 February 2011. 
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Substantively, the EP seems to have changed Commission policy less in a normative way 
than was sometimes expected, while only in a limited number of cases were minority 
conservative positions in the Council supported by the EP. As an overall conclusion, we 
argue that fears that the EP’s involvement would hamper an efficient EU trade policy have 
proved to be unfounded. 
Given that the EP has only been enjoying its increased competences for four and a half years, 
no definite conclusions can be drawn. While in the case of ACTA and the other cases 
discussed above the EP was only involved at the end of the process, in the recently opened 
negotiations the EP will have been fully involved in all three phases of the agreement. New 
negotiations such as the EU-Japan agreement and the TTIP will undoubtedly add colour and 
depth to the picture we have drawn here. These will show how the EP is further 
transforming its legal and political power into real substantial influence.   
Of utmost importance in this regard will be the parliamentary context in which trade policy 
is shaped. If the far left and far right indeed gain seats and if the EPP and the S&D will be of 
equal size, as is predicted in the polls, the already strong left-right divide might be 
exacerbated. While this will lead to more diverse perspectives on EU trade, it will not make it 
easier to negotiate trade policy in the EU. An EP that is more divided might have an impact 
in at least three ways. Firstly, it can have an effect on the willingness of the EP to ensure 
efficient EU trade policy-making. In this scenario, the European Commission and the 
member states cannot take it for granted that the EP will rubber-stamp their decisions. 
Secondly, and related to this, the new composition will have an effect on the credibility of the 
EU in general and the EP in particular. While the current legislature has left its footprint on 
mandates for negotiations with Japan and the US, the next EP might change its mind on 
certain aspects thereby undermining the EU’s trustworthiness with its negotiating partners. 
Thirdly, a European Parliament with more radical representatives that are against free trade 
agreements for socio-economic (radical left) or anti-integrationist (radical right) reasons, and 
a socialist group that is more under pressure from contenders on the left, might move in a 
more protectionist direction. We believe that the position of the S&D group, which has been 
relatively divided on trade issues in the first legislature after Lisbon and is projected to grow 
in power, will be of crucial importance for the outcome of these questions.  
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